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Abstract  
This paper argues that the economic and financial crisis that has ensnared Europe from 
the late 2000s has been instrumental in reshaping employment and social relations in a 
detrimental way for the majority of the European people. It argues that the crisis has 
exacerbated the socio-economic position of most Roma people, immigrants as well as of 
other vulnerable groups. This development is approached here as an outcome of the 
widening structural inequalities that underpin the crisis within an increasingly neoliber- 
alised Europe. Through recent policy developments and public discourses from a 
number of European countries I show how rising inequalities nurture racialised social 
tensions. My account draws on classic and contemporary theoretical propositions that 
have been propounded about the nature of capitalism, its contemporary re-articulation 
as well as its ramification for the future of Europe.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper argues that during crises levels of hostility against the perceived ‘other’, 
that is to say immigrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and so on, increase 
exponentially. My focus is on the largest minority in Europe, the Roma, who have 
been construed as the perennial 'other' in most European societies they live in. More 
recently, the Roma have been at the receiving end of acts of intolerance, 
scapegoating, racism and negative discrimination, ranging from physical abuse and 
harassment to racially motivated pogroms and expulsions from places they legally 
abide in and, invariably, have historical ties with. The Roma, more than any other 
minority group, are routinely demonised and have come to occupy the position of the 
'convenient scapegoat' for European nation-states' inability to provide solutions to 
their economic and political woes, the growing socio-economic inequalities between 
the rich and the poor, the usurping of the national and global wealth by the few and, 
consequently, the emiseration of the many.  
 
I explore some of the factors underlying these developments and analyse their 
implications in a dialectical manner, that is to say in a way that is concerned with the 
Roma relationally and not in isolation from their counterparts, that is the working 
people of Europe. The latter, the European workforce, has sustained a continuous 
attack in the last 30 years or so. For example, in the UK workers have incurred a 
sustained income compression and reduction in social welfare (OBR, in TUC, 2013). 
In Germany they have suffered a sustained income loss, along with a reduction in 
unemployment benefits, and pension rights (Lapavitsas et al., 2010), while in some 
countries of the periphery, such as Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, workers 
have experienced sharp income drops, significant abolition of welfare protection and 
job lossesi. Almost without exception, workers in European countries have abolished 
employment rights, security of employment and have endured a concomitant 
deterioration in their working and living standards. 
 
These circumstances have coincided with conditions of political apathy, social 
anomie and economic catastrophe, which are underpinned by ideological polarisation 
and confusion over working people's alliances, ties and solidarities. The leadership of 
the European Union and most of its member states have been integral in engineering 
the entrapment of the working people of Europe. The latter, are increasingly and 
perilously obfuscating the deteriorating working and living conditions they experience 
with the rise of an artificial threat, that of the Roma, specifically, as well as immigrant 
workers and any kind of 'others', more broadly. Thus, instead of channeling their 
anger at the emiseration and collective degradation of life and employment standards 
that has been affecting the vast majority of the European workforce, they adopt the 
media-fuelled propaganda and delve into a witch-hunt against the Roma, immigrants, 
Muslim people and anyone that occupies a marginal and often stigmatised role in 
their societies.  
 
The current crisis has given impulse to feelings of insecurity, marginalisation and 
victimisation among minority groups, such as the Roma, while, at the same time, it 
has led to the  criminalisation and mounting hostility against them that takes the form 
of abuse and pogroms, racially-motivated attacks, expulsion and further 
stigmatisation. In this context, the virulence of the persecution of such groups in 
many European countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Greece and 
elsewhere, are approached not only as outcomes of the current economic crisis, but 
also as a concerted effort to restore class power from above. That is to say, they are 
structural characteristics interwoven into the current stage of capitalism, namely 
neoliberal capitalism, as it is unfolding in the European landscape, rather than 
aberrations from 'normality'. They are the ugly, yet true face of Europe: a form of 
'European Realism', that is to say a crude representation and encapsulation of the 
social relations in the richest economic area in the world. 
 
My intention in this paper is to offer an appraisal of aspects of current neoliberal 
capitalism within Europe and demonstrate its role in nurturing racial tensions through 
the reshaping of the relations of production and the scapegoating of minority groups, 
such as the Roma. My account is informed by contemporary critiques of neoliberal 
capitalism (Harvey, 2005; Žižek, 2010) but also by classical critical theory, such as 
Horkheimer and Adorno's [1944] (1973) account about the rise of anti-Semitism in 
pre-Second World War Europe. The paper begins with the explication of some key 
tenets of the recent economic crisis as it is manifest in Europe. It then moves on to 
the presentation of some instantiations of the crisis in powerful European countries, 
such as France, the UK and Germany. The third part, draws lessons from the 
European history and the Holocaust in making the case for a departure from the so-
called ‘Roma problem’ to focusing on the problematic system that gives rise to such 
artificial problems. Finally, in the conclusion I discuss some historical antecedents of 
the current crisis, the rearticulation of which could serve as an opportunity to move 
beyond dominant approaches that contribute to the plight of the Roma (and other 
minority groups) and could offer an exit from the current impasse of capitalism that is 
threatening the working people of Europe. 
2. Crisis in Europe and Europe in crisis 
The beginning of one of the most serious financial and economic crises in the history 
of capitalism is thought to be in 2006 in the USA, where house repossessions started 
spreading uncontrollably (Harvey, 2010). In September 2008 the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers went bust and the shockwaves spread rapidly across the globe. 
Since then, many pundits, experts and market specialists have vehemently argued 
that the crisis could have been aborted. A case in point is a report into the reasons 
that led to the financial crisis by the US government-appointed Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (FCIC) (2011), which unequivocally concluded that the crisis 
was preventable. The report stated that its causes were, among other factors, 
extensive failures in financial regulation, remarkable breakdowns in corporate 
governance, ill-prepared policymakers with a lack of a 'full understanding of the 
financial system they oversaw'  (2011, p. xxi) and, intriguingly, systemic lack and/or 
breach of accountability and the code of ethics at all levels. In other words, this was 
not an inescapable catastrophe but a calamity that involved governments, institutions 
and powerful financial, economic  and political actors. Yet, this begs the question: if 
the crisis was preventable, why did it occur in the first place? Or, more importantly, 
given that precious little was done to prevent the crisis, could the latter have been 
welcomed by some (powerful) actors as an opportunity to radically reform the system 
or some aspects within it?   
 
This requires a closer look at what 'crisis' really means within capitalism. Texts in 
political economic theory emphasise the nature of the capitalist system of production 
and its insatiable demand for new markets (McLaren and Farahmandpour, 2005; 
Harman, 2009). More than that, they demonstrate how crises are inbuilt in the 
capitalist mode of production and, in effect, a sine qua non of its continuous quest for 
quantitative development (Luxemburg, (1971)[1899/1908] ; Kautsky, 1982). Marx's 
(1990)[1867]; (1967)[1894] original analysis explicated the way in which capital 
operates and highlighted the inherent conflict between labour and capital. According 
to his thesis (Marx, (1967)[1894]) on the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, 
when this happens, as is the case with the current global recession, various factors 
can be activated in order to ameliorate the consequences. In other words, capitalism 
has the ability and flexibility to activate some mechanisms or counteracting factors 
that can mitigate this tendency described above and enable the system to return the 
system into profitability. One of these mechanisms is the reduction of wages and 
labour cost compression, which can be accompanied by similar mechanisms, such 
as the creation and preservation of a surplus population (see high unemployment) 
and the increase in the exploitation of labour.  
 
This points to the fostering of the conditions for the exploitation of the workforce, the 
deterioration of their employment conditions, the increase in unemployment, the 
usurping of their protection and employment rights, including pension rights, welfare 
protection, education, health and other services that were put in place after the WWII 
in order to secure capitalism's longevity. It is suggested that what the European 
working class is experiencing in this conjuncture is an onslaught that points to the 
second option that capitalism has available as a means of exiting the crisis. In other 
words, capitalism targets the working class in an attempt to reverse the falling rate of 
profit on a global scale, which is what led to the economic crisis in the first place. 
  
In order to shed light on these developments, I discuss how the crisis has been 
profoundly transforming the world of employment and social relations. As growth 
diminishes (or stays at very low levels) jobs are getting lost by the day. At the same 
time, the occupational structure is being reshaped while the labour market is also 
undergoing radical changes. Some argue that a yet more flexible economy is in the 
making while others talk about the further casualisation of employment, a serious 
loss in workers’ rights and the worsening of working conditions (Callinicos, 2010). 
Although the precise impact of these developments on the European Roma is less 
well known, the ramifications for groups with similar characteristics, that is to say with 
low socio-economic background are discernible. For example, the economic crisis 
has led to high unemployment, which has become one of the most pressing issues in 
Europe. Characteristically, in late 2010 and early 2011, 15 out the 27 European 
Union countries had unemployment rates of over 8% while 10 countries saw 
unemployment rising beyond 11% (Eurostat, 2011). In late 2013, unemployment in 
the Eurozone area was 12.2%, while five of its member-states (namely, Portugal, 
Cyprus, Croatia, Spain and Greece) had higher unemployment than 15% (Eurostat, 
2013). In other words, unemployment has become the matrix of socio-economic 
failure for many European countries while the labour market has become the field par 
excellence of the denial of the right to employment and concomitant exclusion of a 
sizable part of European citizenry from key institutions as well as social, economic 
and civic activities.  
 Among other things, unemployment is associated with lower levels of physical and 
mental health (Jin et al, 1995). In addition, unemployment and economic insecurity 
play a significant role in the reshaping of social relations. A recent study by the 
Europe Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI, 2010) pointed out that 
racism has soared during the current economic crisis and immigrants, foreigners and 
other marginalised groups, such as the Roma, are increasingly identified as the 
victims of intolerance, negative discrimination and racism. In addition, as far as the 
Roma are concerned, they have been associated with sustained acts of 
discrimination both at an institutional as well at a personal level (OSCE, 2008). The 
history and intensity of the hostility and marginalisation of the Roma has been 
extensively discussed elsewhere (Liégeois, 2007; Revenga et al., 2002). While it 
manifestly predates the current financial and economic crisis, it has been 
accentuated by it and has taken new dimensions. Here, I focus on the hostility 
against the Roma in Europe that coincided with the crisis.  
 
3. The time of the Roma in times of crisis 
While some Roma groups lead a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, this is mainly 
pursued within a single country of residence. In any case, the majority of Roma 
people lead sedentary lifestyles (Liégeois, 1994). The European Roma are 
historically rooted in most countries in which they currently live. In other words, the 
historical embeddedness of the European Roma cannot be disputed more than for 
any other European group (Themelis, 2008). This feature makes them ‘a true 
European minority’ (Council of Europe, 1993). Nevertheless, the European Roma are 
in many contexts perceived as transient, foreign, or even ‘alien’ groups (Bhopal and 
Myers, 2008). 
In the recent years rising hostility has been evidenced against many European Roma 
groups and, especially after 2008, their living and working conditions have 
dramatically deteriorated. I start by exemplifying the link between the economic crisis 
and the worsening of the treatment of Roma groups by focusing on France, a country 
that had been wrestling with social unrest and rising dissent by its disaffected urban 
and suburban population since the new millennium. I then present some other 
examples of anti-Roma (and anti-immigrant) hostility in other European countries, in 
order to explain the relationship between the reshaping of neoliberal capitalism and 
enmity against the ‘other’. In October 2005, the forgotten youth of Paris, that is 
unemployed teenagers ‘from destitute suburban housing projects’ (Sahlins, 2006), 
took to the streets after the electrocution of two French youths of Malian and 
Tunisian descent, who were trying to flee the police. The protests soon spread to 
more than 274 towns within the city of Paris and beyond. As a result, several schools 
and other public buildings, and approximately 10,000 cars incinerated in three weeks 
of civil unrest. In March 2009, Muslim youth clashed anew with the police, while 
tensions and uprisings in the French capital seemed to be interwoven in its 
contemporary social fabric. At the same time, the far-right, represented politically by 
the Front National, was raising its political influence among the disaffected urban 
working class and all those discontent with and affected by the rising unemployment 
and inequalities in the French society and the declining living standards.  
 
To all these acute social problems the French government responded with 
disproportionate force against the Roma (and immigrants), a set of acts with high 
symbolic significance. To be precise, the expulsion of approximately 700 Roma 
people with Romanian and Bulgarian background from various sites in France in 
August 2010 was shocking, though not without precedent. In July of the same year, 
the French national assembly passed a law that banned the Islamic face covering. In 
the ‘face of it’, this is about women’s emancipation and, in effect, about ‘égalité’, one 
of the cornerstones of the French Republic. However, something else was at play 
here. As Scott (2010) put it, this was ‘part of a campaign to purify and protect 
national identity, purging so-called foreign elements – although many of these 
"foreigners" are actually French citizens – from membership in the nation’. It is part of 
an inimical bid by the then French president Nicolas Sarkozy and his government ‘to 
capture the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim [and anti-Roma] animus that has brought 
electoral gains to the rightwing National Front party and to disarm the Socialist 
opposition, which has so far offered little resistance to the xenophobic campaign’ 
(Scott, 2010). Lest there are any doubts about the determination of the French 
government of the time to make political capital from the situation, it chose that 
moment to announce another two policies directed against the Roma and 
immigrants, namely ‘the criminalisation of entire families rather than just individuals 
and the stripping of citizenship from immigrants with criminal convictions’ (Brooks, 
2010). The dynamism of the French government has been described as ‘a chilling 
moment in French history, a cynical mobilisation of racist feeling that risks unleashing 
an even worse atmosphere of pogrom and violence against minorities, immigrants 
and all black people’ (Kimber, 2010). 
 
But what was the ulterior meaning of the Sarkozy government’s actions against the 
Roma and immigrants? How can we understand and explain the attack on groups 
who occupy a marginal position in the labour market and pose no threat to the 
French state and the rest of the workforce? Understanding France, means 
understanding contemporary Europe. The French government aimed to show that it 
can be taken seriously by its European counterparts and its domestic electorate. The 
point it was trying to make was that France is a masterful state who is willing and 
able to exercise its force, no matter how brute and disproportionate, when it deems 
appropriate. The deportation of a few hundreds of Roma people did not resolve the 
social, economic or other problems facing France. Sending back to Romania and 
Bulgaria children, who comprised a big proportion of the Roma people under attack, 
has to be seen as a symbolic act by the French government to show its resoluteness 
to exercise control in its own territory, that it can put its house in order. But who is the 
French government trying to persuade of its ability to bring ‘order’? What is at stake 
here? The French government’s intention was to create a scapegoat, that is to say 
‘an easy target for politicians seeking to distract attention from problems at home by 
playing on fears over security’ (Hollinger and Bryant, 2010). In addition, there was 
something bigger at stake here. Despite the fact that the prime audience of the 
French government was the domestic electorate, some lessons for the rest of Europe 
can be extrapolated. France plays a leading role in Europe and, together with 
Germany, they are at the helm of the Eurozone economy. The impact of domestic 
actions in either of these countries extends far beyond their borders as the two 
countries have the ability to influence the policies of their counterparts within the 
Eurozone and European Union more broadly. 
 
Incidentally, similarly tough measures against the Roma were announced at the 
same time in Germany, though the latter initially publicly distanced itself from the 
French approach. Specifically, in the summer of 2010 Germany forcefully repatriated 
to Kosovo approximately 12,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. This massive act of 
repatriation was undertaken without due consideration of the wellbeing of deportees 
and the most vulnerable among them, the children. According to a report by UNICEF 
(2010, p. 7) serious concerns were raised about ‘the return of individuals without a 
secure residence status to Kosovo’, as well as about the fact that ‘the best interests 
of these children have not so far been considered a priority, despite the fact that over 
half of these individuals with Roma background are children and almost two-thirds of 
them were born and have grown up in Germany’. For the German government it was 
more important to flex its muscle by yielding incommensurate force to eliminate an 
artificial problem, rather than use its sizable economic and political power to resolve 
it. Taking into account the conditions that awaited those forcefully repatriated, there 
is little doubt over Germany’s real motives:  
‘Three out of four returned children no longer attend school in 
Kosovo. A considerable number do not possess a birth certificate 
and are therefore unable to exercise their right to educational, 
medical or welfare services. Severe trauma and chronic illness 
among many of the adults in these families, whether in Germany or 
Kosovo, mean that too many children are obliged to take on too 
much responsibility too early in life (UNICEF, 2010, p. 8). 
The aggressive approach of both the French and German governments, were swiftly 
emulated by the UK, who prepared legislation, also in the summer of 2010, allowing 
its authorities to evict Roma and Traveller families from campsites they abide in. This 
follows forced evictions, such as of residents in the Dale Fare, a Traveller camp site 
in Essex, South East England. The local council, namely Basildon, decided to devote 
close to a third of its annual budget, that is £8 millionii (BBC, 2012), in order to evict 
86 Traveller families in what was coined as the ‘battle of Basildon’ (Barkham, 2011). 
Thus, the shift to the terrain of legitimate 'Romanophobia' and state-subsidised anti-
Gypsyism was successfully marked and would soon become the new 'realpolitik' 
within the UK. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, signaled this turn through a 
carefully-crafted speech he delivered to a German audience in February 2011: 
‘We must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home.  
Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years 
and a much more active, muscular liberalism.  A passively tolerant 
society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just 
leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values. But I 
believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in 
certain values and actively promotes them.  Freedom of speech, 
freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights 
regardless of race, sex or sexuality.  It says to its citizens, this is 
what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these 
things’. 
Cameron chose strategically this occasion to proclaim the death of multiculturalism 
and the need to unite around the values of an ill-defined ‘muscular liberalism'. Not 
only did he seek to express his alignment with Germany on issues of immigration, 
border control and the growing intolerance in both countries against Muslims, 
immigrants and the Roma, he also intended to make political gains against the 
growing influence of the far-rightiii. The quest for 'stronger societies' that Cameron 
advocates in his speech is to be based on the creation of 'stronger identities at 
home'. And a predicament in fostering such identities is 'passive tolerance'. In terms 
of applied public policy, this can be understood as follows: tolerating the existence of 
some Roma families who live in the Dale Farm is part of a passe, wrong kind of 
liberalism. Juxtapose this to the right kind, that is 'muscular liberalism' that Cameron 
heralded, which is underpinned by the active promotion of 'certain values', such as 
'freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights 
regardless of race, sex or sexuality'. However, the people who were targeted by the 
UK's 'muscular policies', such as the evicted residents of the Dale Farm, are not 
against the values Cameron highlighted in his speech. For it is an insular and 
duplicitous form of liberalism and multiculturalism that Cameron purports. On one 
hand, it respects diversity, but on the other it seeks to dismantle it by creating a 
stronger sense of 'us' and 'them'. By telling a German audience 'to belong here is to 
believe in these things', Cameron is alluding to a purified, dominant and powerful 
group within Europe that has the right to be protected by any perceived threats. In 
doing so, he was pledging allegiance to the most powerful European leader, Angela 
Merkel, who was keen to recruit allies in suppressing any group(s) who dared threat 
this newly-formed liberalism, no matter how vaguely the latter was defined. This type 
of liberalism, I argue, is European neoliberalism in disguise, that is the new form of 
organisation that is emerging from the ashes of financial and economic meltdown. Its 
main difference from its predecessor is that while it upholds allegiance to the basic 
human rights, the rule of law and democracy, it concurrently seeks to 
compartmentalise dismantle and eventually dismantle them.  
Consonant with this type of European neoliberalism is the principle underpinning the 
state-led expulsions of the Roma in France, Germany and the UK and other 
countries. In this way a unifying form of discrimination is created by powerful 
European states with the pretext of acting to protect human and other rights for the 
majority of their citizens. Invoking liberal values has been proven to be a sine qua 
non of political rhetoric as the European citizenry is sensitised to 'unreconstructed', 
ugly racism of, say the 1950s. The latter, would take the form of 'no Irish, no Roma' 
signs outside pubs, harassment, and verbal or physical abuse, but would now seem 
as an anathema to the liberal consensus. Nevertheless, the tensions this liberal pact 
masks are not to be underestimated. As Žižek (2010) points out:  
‘Progressive liberals are, of course, horrified by such populist racism. 
However, a closer look reveals how their multicultural tolerance and 
respect of differences share with those who oppose immigration the 
need to keep others at a proper distance. “The others are OK, I 
respect them,” the liberals say, “but they must not intrude too much 
on my own space. The moment they do, they harass me.” 
The examples offered above are only a few selected ones in terms of economically 
advanced European countries that waged an overt attack against the perceived 
‘others’, such as the Roma. Sadly, they are not the only ones. In 2008, Italy shocked 
Europe with its adoption of a fingerprinting scheme for all Roma people living within 
its borders. Although the policy was initially condemned by the European Parliament, 
it was eventually approved by the European Commission (OSCE, 2008). Similarly, 
Denmark contravened EU legislation in order to deport what it described as the 
‘criminal Roma’. In the Czech Republic, entire communities have been harassed by 
far-right organisations under the nose of the local authorities. In Greece, ‘a series of 
(quasi-) judicial decisions regarding some aspects of […] discrimination, namely 
racist police violence, inadequate housing and evictions and exclusion from or 
segregation in education have been ignored by Greek authorities’ (Dimitras, 2010), 
while similar accounts can also be drawn from other European countries.  
 
The governments of European states, and especially some powerful ones among 
them, such as France, Germany and the UK, share some crucial characteristics. 
First, the force they use against some of the most marginalised groups in their 
societies is disproportionate to the threat posed by the latter. In fact, this force only 
serves to reassert the powerlessness of the targeted groups. At the same time, 
though, it serves as a reminder of the real interests of the state, reaffirmed as they 
are in times of crisis. Hence, instead of protecting the most vulnerable the state 
becomes a force field that internalises class relations (Harvey, 2005, p. 11), in that it 
exerts its power, real and symbolic, to deny subordinated groups the right to adobe, 
employment, health, education and so on. The message of this type of acts of state-
violence is simple: in dire economic conditions the state is poised to protect its ‘true’ 
citizens from ‘episodic intruders’, such as immigrants, and unwanted others, such as 
the Roma. Secondly, these selfsame nation-states do nothing to deal with the 
problems endemic in their countries, such as unacceptably high unemployment, 
spiraling social inequalities, unprecedented poverty rise, continuously suppressed 
wages and so on. By contrast, they create new target groups and choose to recycle 
their stigmatising practices against existing ones, in order to obfuscate the real 
issues threatening their societies. That is, they mask the shifting of class power from 
the poor to the rich and the further worsening of the position of the working class, 
who is divided between ‘native’ and ‘alien’ workforce and, thusly, occluded from 
taking meaningful action against those truly responsible for its sinking, namely those 
who exploit it.   
 
4. Crisis opportunism and the specter of the Holocaust 
In recent years, immigration in Europe as well as dealing with the ‘other’ has become 
one of the most fervently debated topics. It would not be an exaggeration to claim 
that, in some countries at least, these issues have triggered a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 
1972). Although the positive benefits from immigration for the host country have been 
lucidly documented (Facchini and Mayda, 2008), many European countries, such 
France and Germany, have been undeterred from excluding immigrants, 
documented and undocumented alike, from receiving welfare benefits (Escandell and 
Ceobanu, 2009). In a similar fashion, other countries, such as Spain, Italy and the 
UK, have reformed their entry and citizenship criteria in order to impose limits on 
immigration. In the logic of those who designed them, these policies are justified by 
the new reality the financial and economic crisis has brought about. This has blithely 
led to the mainstreaming of a 'blame-the-foreigners' approach, which, purportedly, 
protects the native workforce from labour market rigidities. That is to say, when the 
pie is shrinking, having fewer members sharing it, can act as a ‘relieving valve’. 
Against this systemic view, I argue that this line of reasoning is nothing but a 
smokescreen for a concerted effort on behalf of the ruling class to renew the rules of 
submission of labour into capital. Thusly, the resultant division of the workforce, and 
society at large, into 'us' and 'them', ruptures existing solidarities and aborts the 
possibility of establishing new ones. As such it has to be viewed as an orchestrated 
attack against the unity of the labour force and a lever against the formation of 
potential class alliances. This is facilitated, mediated and materialised through 
apposite ideological propositions, such as the one that views economic crises as 
opportunities.  
This 'crisis opportunism' and the reasoning behind it has been underpinning and 
permeating the financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 and has now 
ensnared Europe. According to it, a crisis is welcomed as a way of breaking away 
with the old state of affairs, which includes any 'social contracts' governments had 
forged to protect the democratic, welfare, civil, labour and other rights of their 
citizens. Hence, crises are not invidious, so long as they can be exploited as a 
means of promoting the dicta of the new phase of neoliberal capitalism. This attitude 
to crises has been repeatedly (p)raised in mainstream media and was most lucidly 
exemplified by Rahm Emanuel, Barack Obama's chief-of-staff (in Blinder, 2009) ‘You 
don’t ever want a serious crisis to go to waste; it’s an opportunity to do important 
things that you would otherwise avoid’. To be precise, it was in the early-1990s that 
the global elite formulated a vision for a new world order where crises could enable 
governments to cut back social, economic and political gains that have been 
achieved in the first four decades after the Second World War. John Williamson 
(1994), the man who was instrumental in the conference that gave birth to the so-
called 'Washington Consensus'iv, emphatically exclaimed: “the worst of times give 
rise to the best opportunities for those who understand the need for fundamental 
economic reform”. This is not only the moment when crisis-opportunism was born, 
but, crucially, when it was given an ideological justification for much of the state 
restructuring and policy impetus that would follow. This approach exemplifies the 
'new spirit of capitalism' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) that has triumphantly 
reasserted itself after the end of the Cold War, the termination of which has found 
capitalism bouncing back as the only system of socio-economic and political 
organisation. In such as context, capitalism has found fertile conditions to be further 
entrenched as a totalising system that it is, but also to assert itself as a monopoly 
system. That is to say, as a system that is no longer interested in respecting and 
sustaining traditional entities, such as the nation-state, neither institutions and 
arrangements that have been fundamental in the post-war period in a majority of 
European countries, such as the welfare state.  
While crises are inherent features of capitalist development, as argued above, the 
exploitation and even manufacturing of crises on a grand scale, such as the one that 
threatens to dismantle the Eurozone and especially the periphery of the European 
Union, are characteristic of the current and most virulent stage of capitalism yet, 
namely neoliberal capitalism. In this vein, we should not be taken aback by the 
inability of European governments to safeguard the return to social stability, 
economic growth and political credibility even of the quasi-democratic political 
system European citizens used to enjoy until recently. Instead we ought to identify, 
explicate and openly discuss the origins of the current crisis in order to expose it for 
what it is: a welcomed opportunity for the ruling class to reorganise production and 
employment against the interests of the working people of Europe.  
 
In this light, the resurgence in the marginalisation and stigmatisation of Roma and 
other minority groups within Europe has to be approached as an outcome of the 
reorganisation of labour and restructuring of class relations. According to one of the 
richest people in the world, Warren Buffet 'there’s been class warfare going on for the 
last 20 years, and my class has won' (Buffett, 2011, in Sargent).  This win of capital 
against labour is the product of the restoration of class power that neoliberal 
capitalism has ushered in (Harvey, 2005). This entails the suppression of wages, the 
enhancement of flexibility in the workplace, the deterioration of working conditions, 
the intensification of precarious employment, in a nutshell the 'dismantling of the 
world of work' (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005).  The workers then, instead of 
mobilising to protect their rights in unison with the other oppressed segments of the 
workforce, are split between ‘native’ and ‘foreigner’ labourers, 'us' and 'them', and are 
fighting against a set of 'ghost enemy', such as the Roma, immigrants and any other 
groups conveniently constructed as the 'other'. That is to say, instead of combating 
structural injustices that lie at the core of the capitalist system of production, the 
labourforce is invited to compartmentalise these issues by ethnicising them. In this 
way, systemic failures of the capitalist production are masked under the rubric of 
'ethnic differences', lack of inclusion of specific groups, incompatibility of lifestyles 
between 'us' and 'them' and so on. 
 
However, this is not a new situation. It is by now a familiar tactic employed by the 
ruling class to tear asunder the working class in pursuit of its own interests. A case in 
point is the fascist National Socialist party before the Second World War, which 
invented an enemy, namely the Jews, but also homosexual people, the Roma, 
communists and other groups, in order to divide the working class and justify the 
atrocities that would follow. In a similar fashion, nowadays, the Roma principally but 
also other minority groups, are being used as the enemy of the increasingly 
repressive and non-democratic European order in order to obfuscate the organised 
onslaught on the working class. This strategy turns the latter, namely the working 
class, against itself thusly further diminishing their chances of acting as a social class 
in-itself (Marx, (1955)[1847]) and disabling it from partaking in the reconstitution of 
class boundaries as well as the restoration of class power. The latter, the rebalancing 
of class power, is left entirely to the capitalist class, who act under the auspices of 
the state, which, in this instance is acting as the as an instrument for the restoration 
of class power from above, as an ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’ (Marx and 
Engels, (1977)[1848]). More specifically, the European nation-states have become 
void of any democratic, political, moral and axiological legitimacy and they are 
increasingly being transformed into arenas where local, that is national elites, 
compete for domination and access into the international markets and the global 
arena of capital. The unsuccessful life and slow death of the (people of the) 
Eurozone is nothing but an exemplification of this very war waged by the European 
ruling class in their fight for a bigger share in the global market. This route requires 
the subordination of the working class and is not travelled for the first time. As I 
argued in the previous sections, the selective scapegoating of immigrants and other 
minority groups has been consequential in shaping public attitudes, especially in 
times of crisis such as the current ones. While minority groups, such as the Roma, 
are more often blamed rather than recognised for their multiple contributions to the 
societies where they live in, since the beginning of the financial and economic crisis 
they have also taken the role of the collective scapegoat, the ‘convenient enemy’ 
(Fekete, 2009). This practice is deeply destabilising and socially divisive, as it places 
segments of the population against each other. Yet, this is not an entirely new 
phenomenon. The history of scapegoating and racism in Europe goes as far back as 
the establishment of the European nation-states and most recently played out in the 
tragic built up to the Second World War. Horkheimer and Adorno’s [1944] (1973) 
lucid analysis serves as a powerful reminder of the creation of scapegoats in order to 
manipulate the mass of the working people and disguise the organised barbarism 
committed by the Nazis. According to this account, the targeting of the Jewsv was 
nothing but an act of concealment by the Nazi leadership of the National Socialist 
party of their intentions to dominate the working class:  
 
‘The Jews are today the group which, in practice and in theory, 
draws to itself the destructive urge which the wrong social order 
spontaneously produces. They are branded as absolute evil by 
absolute evil. […] Now that power is no longer needed for 
economic reasons, the Jews are designated as its absolute object, 
existing merely for the exercise of power’ [1944] (1973, p. 137).  
 
The demonisation of the Jews, that is to say turning Jewish people into objects of evil 
by the Nazi apparatus, was not justified by the objective position in the relation to the 
means of production Jewish people occupied at that time nor by the power and 
influence they exercised in economic, political and social terms. Rather, it was 
orchestrated by the Nazis who aimed to hide from the German people the 
appropriation of goods and property the Nazis themselves confiscated from the 
Jews. The construction of the Jews as the 'evil within the German society', enabled 
the Nazi leadership to create a collective scapegoat, while the ultimate target was the 
German workers themselves: ‘The workers who are the real target, are 
understandably not told as much to their faces. […] In the image of the Jew which the 
racial nationalists hold up before the world they express their own essence. Their 
craving is for exclusive ownership, appropriation, unlimited power, and at any price.’ 
[1944] (1973, p. 137). 
 
The construction of the Jews as the negative principle, the 'absolute evil', was an 
effective way of transposing to the latter the characteristics of the former, that is of 
the Nazi leadership. For the Nazi pursuit for complete control and domination 
encompassed all domains of life: ideological, psychological, economic, social, 
political, spiritual and so on. The Nazis were in quest of an expedient way of 
rationalising and legitimising the extensive inequalities nested in the German society 
of the time. Instead then of distributing the wealth accumulated by the confiscation of 
Jewish property and assets, the Nazis manufactured the ‘convenient enemy’, the 
Jews. Thusly, they could conceal the rampant inequalities emanating from the 
sphere of production, and the reproduction of the conditions of total subordination of 
the working class. The latter, that is to say the working class, had two options: either 
to join the Nazis in venting their anger at the convenient enemy and assist them in 
their eventual obliteration, or stay impartial and allow the Nazis to complete their 
deadly job.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Although no organised crime of the scale and nature of the Nazi atrocities has since 
taken place in Europe, there are numerous other examples of ideologically-motivated 
conflict or even war used in order to divide the working people of Europe. These 
wars are invariably underpinned by a process of scapegoating and persecution of a 
relatively powerless and marginal minority, such as ethnic minorities in former 
Yugoslavia. Scapegoating and the construction of collective enemies is a practice 
that seems to reemerge ever stronger during times of economic recession and labour 
market restructuring. In the early 2000s in the UK, for example, this practice has 
found application in the demonisation of asylum seekers and refugees and their 
representation as ‘bogus, as illegal immigrants and economic migrants scrounging at 
capital’s gate and threatening capital’s culture’ (Fekete, 2001). This ideological 
postulation, which is invariably accompanied by analogous media frenzy, is 
appropriated by policy makers in order to legitimise the exclusion of these groups 
from the sharing of public resources and the distraction of the general public from the 
increasing inequality in the sharing of resources, the redistribution from the poor to 
the rich that has been occurring in the last 30 years or so. A big part of those 
targeted at that time were Eastern European Roma, who were used once gain as the 
convenient enemy to justify new anti-immigration policies.  
 
More than a decade later and the deepening of the economic and financial crisis has 
exacerbated the socio-economic position of most European Roma, immigrants and 
other vulnerable groups. As such, this development has to be approached as an 
outcome of the widening of structural inequalities that have been accompanying the 
crisis within the increasingly neoliberalised Euroscape. In this conjuncture, most 
politicians in Europe 'would rather not examine the cause of the economic crisis 
roiling the continent—many were complicit in dismantling the checks and balances 
that eventually led to the current recession—“criminal gypsies” come in very handy.' 
(Hallinan, 2010). However, the recent history of Europe should serve as a reminder. 
As Bauman argued in his seminal 'Modernity and the Holocaust' (1989), lack of 
democracy was a problem for the Holocaust. European states, instead of sliding 
further down this anti-democratic and xenophobic road that burst asunder Europe in 
the 1940s, should remind themselves that 'what happened to the Jews has been 
instrumentalized and transformed into an ideology of legitimation for the present 
system.' (Postone, 1980, p. 98). The European Roma, while they are similarly used 
to instrumentalise and ideologically legitimise the structural violence and unfairness 
of the current system, they should not be left to have the fate of the Jews in the 
Holocaust. Perhaps more than than ever the ongoing socio-economic, democratic, 
and political crisis within Europe might unite the working people of Europe to defend 
all segments of society against the neoliberal assault and turn the crisis of the 
system into an opportunity for the people. 
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